Social and philosophical considerations for qualitative research on irrational beliefs
Abstract
Irrational beliefs are a psychological construct proposed by Albert Ellis, which refers to a type of dogmatic and inflexible cognitions that a person maintains about personal values and goals. The main interest in these beliefs is that they generate mental health conditions such as stress, anxiety, and depression, in addition to tending to develop dysfunctional behavior in the person, which makes it difficult to achieve goals. This construct has been studied mostly from a quantitative methodology with results that have allowed to confirm various hypotheses of interest that are properly psychological, specifically for cognitive-behavioral psychology. However, these beliefs have an origin in the dynamism between the individual and society, in addition to presenting some difficulties of a philosophical nature, so studying these beliefs from a qualitative methodology can contribute to sociological studies from a Weberian perspective, and to deepen the fundamental understanding of irrational beliefs, through a fully philosophical reflection, particularly with elements of Stoic philosophy, Husserl's phenomenology, and Kantian imperatives. Theories are approached from different axes regarding psychological, methodological, sociological, and philosophical considerations, for the understanding of the scientific relevance of carrying out research with a qualitative approach and the need to integrate a properly sociological and philosophical reflection in the process.
Downloads
References
Balkis, M. (2013). Academic procrastination, academic life satisfaction and academic achievement: The mediation role of rational beliefs about studying. Journal of Cognitive and Behavioral Psychotherapies, 13(1), 57–74.
Bartucz, M. B., y David, D. O. (2019). Irrational beliefs at country level functioning: A cross-cultural extension of the cognitive-behavioral model. Journal of Evidence-Based Psychotherapies, 19(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.24193/jebp.2019.1.1
Cabrera, C. (2017). La apropiación husserliana del Imperativo Categórico. Arete, 29(1), 29–58. https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201701.002
Carlson, S. (2014). Reducción monadológica y reducción fenomenológica: el problema de la reducción en Husserl y en Richir. Eikasia: revista de filosofía, 57, 239–256.
Chan, H. W. Q. y Sun, C. F. R. (2020). Irrational beliefs, depression, anxiety, and stress among university students in Hong Kong. Journal of American College Health. https://doi.org/10.1080/07448481.2019.1710516
David, D., DiGiuseppe, R., Dobrean, A., Păsărelu, C. R. y Balazsi, R. (2019). The Measurement of Irrationality and Rationality. En M. Bernard y W. Dryden (Eds.), Advances in REBT (pp. 79–100). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93118-0_4
David, D. O., Matu, S. A., Podina, I. R. y Predatu, R. M. (2019). Future Research Directions for REBT. En M- Bernard y W. Dryden (Eds.), Advances in REBT (pp. 121–146). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93118-0_6
DiGiuseppe, R., Leaf, R., Gorman, B. y Robin, M. W. (2017). The Development of a Measure of Irrational/Rational Beliefs. Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 36(1), 47–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10942-017-0273-3
Dryden, W. (2019). The Distinctive Features of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy. En M. E. Bernard & W. Dryden (Eds.), Advances in REBT. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93118-0
Dryden, W. y Still, A. (1998). REBT and rationality: Philosophical approaches. Journal of Rational - Emotive and Cognitive - Behavior Therapy, 16(2), 77–99. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024920326970
Duek, M. (2009). Individuo y soociedad: perspectivas teórico-metodológicas en la Sociología Clásica. Argumentos: Estudios Críticos de la Sociedad, 22(60), 9–24.
Duek, C. e India, G. (2005). Individualismo metodológico y concepción del Estado en Max Weber. La acción individual como productora del orden político. Universum. Revista de humanidades y ciencias sociales, 27.
Ellis, A. (1962). Reason and emotion in psychotherapy. Lyle Stuart, Inc.
Ellis, A. (2003). Early Theories and Practices of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy and How They Have Been Augmented and Revised During the Last Three Decades. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 21(3–4), 219–243. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025890112319
Ellis, A., David, D. y Lynn, S. J. (2009). Rational and Irrational Beliefs: A Historical and Conceptual Perspective. En D. David, S. Lynn y A. Ellis (Eds.), Rational and Irrational Beliefs: Research, Theory, and Clinical Practice (pp. 3–22). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0001
Ellis, A. y DiGiuseppe, R. (1993). Are inappropriate or dysfunctional feelings in rational-emotive therapy qualitative or quantitative? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 17(5), 471–477. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01173058
Ellis, A. y Dryden, W. (1989). Práctica de la Terapia Racional Emotiva. Springer Publishing Company.
Kant, E. (1921). Fundamentación de la Metafísica de las Costumbres. [P. M. Rosario Barbosa (ed.)].
Lagunes, R. (2017). Recomendaciones sobre los procedimientos de construcción y validación de instrumentos y escalas de medición en la psicología de la salud. Psicología y Salud, 27(1), 5–18.
Martínez Guerrero, J. M. (2004). En torno a la “Reducción” en Husserl. Isla de Arriarán, 23, 381–398.
Marx, C. (2014). El capital: Crítica de la economía política (4a ed.). Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Oriondo Gates, R. L., Bernui Leo, I., Valdivieso Izquierdo, L. R. y Estrada Menacho, E. (2013). Relación entre colesterol dietario, consumo de huevo y perfil lipídico en adultos aparentemente sanos, según grupos de edad. Anales de la Facultad de Medicina, 74(1), 27. https://doi.org/10.15381/anales.v74i1.2036
Ortiz Delgado, F. M. (2018). Los Sentimientos Ante La (Nada Terrible) Muerte En La Filosofía Estoica. Stoa, 9(17), 7–25. https://doi.org/10.25009/s.2018.17.2532
Placencia, L. (2016). Kant y el problema de la Razón Instrumental. Revista de Filosofia: Aurora, 28(44), 409–431. https://doi.org/10.7213/aurora.28.044.DS02
Portantiero, J. C. y de Ipola, E. (1987). Estado y sociedad en el pensamiento clásico. Cántaro.
Stephenson, E., Watson, P. J., Chen, Z. J. y Morris, R. J. (2018). Self-Compassion, Self-Esteem, and Irrational Beliefs. Current Psychology, 37(4), 809–815. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-017-9563-2
Still, A. (2009). Rationality and Rational Psychotherapy: The Heart of REBT. D. David, S. Lynn y A. Ellis (Eds.), Rational and Irrational Beliefs: Research, Theory, and Clinical Practice (pp. 23–48). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195182231.003.0002
Still, A. y Dryden, W. (1998). The intellectual origins of rational psychotherapy. History of the Human Sciences, 11(3), 63–86. https://doi.org/10.1177/095269519801100304
Turner, M. J., Carrington, S. y Miller, A. (2019). Psychological distress across sport participation groups: The mediating effects of secondary irrational beliefs on the relationship between primary irrational beliefs and symptoms of anxiety, anger, and depression. Journal of Clinical Sport Psychology, 13(1), 17–40. https://doi.org/10.1123/jcsp.2017-0014
Weber, M. (1990). Ensayos sobre metodología sociológica (2a ed.). Amorrortu.
Weber, M. (1992). El problema de la irracionalidad en las ciencias sociales (2a ed.). Tecnos.
Žeželj, I. y Lazarević, L. B. (2019). Irrational beliefs. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 15(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.5964/ejop.v15i1.1903
The authors retain the rights to their work guaranteeing this journal the right of first publication, committing to cite the Journal of Social Sciences as a reference of the original publication.
The works published in the Journal are published under the terms indicated in the Creative Commons License with the International Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 4.0).
